After Ex-Spy's Poisoning, EU Action on Russia Is Far From a Sure Thing

Simon Nixon

The Wall Street Journal

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March 18, 2018 1:26 p.m. ET

It isn’t yet completely clear who poisoned former Russian spy Sergei Skripal or why. But if the nerve-agent attack two weeks ago in the English city of Salisbury was launched by the Kremlin partly to expose weakness and division in Europe, then it could hardly have been better timed.

The European Union is engaged in increasingly acrimonious negotiations with the U.K. over Brexit; the Italian election two weeks ago resulted in more than half the seats in the new parliament being taken by parties with pro-Kremlin sympathies; the EU’s internal cohesion is being constantly tested by debates over how to respond to the migration crisis, how to reform the eurozone and how to respond to alleged risks to the rule of law in Poland.

True, the EU so far has managed to put on a good display of solidarity with the U.K. since Prime Minister Theresa May accused the Russian government of responsibility for the first use of chemical weapons in Europe since World War II. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a strongly-worded statement alongside President Donald Trump blaming Russia for the attack. European Commission first vice president Frans Timmermans, high representative Federica Mogherini and other EU leaders also issued supportive statements.

But the real test of the EU’s response will come when the Skripal affair is discussed Monday at a meeting of EU foreign ministers and Thursday at a summit of EU leaders. What, if any action, will the EU take to punish Russia?

The Commission says that will depend on what support the U.K. requests from the EU. The U.K. itself so far has expelled 23 diplomats who it says are undeclared spies; Russia has responded by expelling 23 British diplomats. Now the U.K. is considering further action. But it will need to balance any request for broader collective action at the EU level against a realistic assessment of what the EU might agree to.

Finding a way forward won’t be easy. Inevitably, the Brexit factor cannot be ignored. Mrs. May made clear in a speech last month that she wants the U.K. to maintain a close security relationship with the EU post-Brexit. The current crisis has provided an early opportunity to demonstrate that such cooperation is certainly in the interests of both sides. Even so, London may be wary of making demands of the EU at a delicate moment in the Brexit negotiations with EU leaders due to decide Friday whether to agree to the UK’s request for a 20 month post-Brexit standstill transition period. Nor does it help that the person who would be doing the asking is foreign secretary Boris Johnson, a controversial figure in EU diplomatic circles having led the campaign for Brexit and previously likened the EU to the Third Reich.

It is also an open question what if anything the EU could accomplish given that any collective action in the foreign-policy sphere must be agreed upon by all 28 member states.

The EU has two sets of sanctions against Russia in place since 2014: diplomatic sanctions imposed following Russia’s annexation of Crimea; and economic sanctions to punish Russia for its support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine. But while the EU has continued to roll over these sanctions whenever required, some member states—including Italy, Hungary and Greece—have questioned the effectiveness of the EU’s approach to Russia and called for greater dialogue.

Any demand for new EU action will be particularly difficult for Italy’s caretaker government given the postelection dynamics and will depend in part on whether the U.K. brings compelling proof of Russian involvement to this week’s meetings, says one senior Italian political figure.

Even in central and Eastern Europe, where awareness of the Russian threat is most acute, there is realism about what more can be done at an EU level.

In their reaction to the Skripal affair, there is an element of “I told you so” among officials and security analysts in Poland and the Baltic states: Many privately blame the UK’s limp response to the 2006 poisoning of another Russian, Alexander Litvinenko, and the UK’s remarkable openness to Russian oligarchs for making Britain particularly vulnerable to such an attack. Few believe that the EU is likely to agree fresh economic or diplomatic sanctions against Russia on this occasion, but many in Eastern Europe would regard a clear commitment not to dismantle existing sanctions as a welcome result.

Of course, the risk for the EU is that any public divisions over Russia will only further highlight its strategic weakness. It is notable that alongside discussion of Russia and Brexit on the summit agenda this week will be a debate over EU relations with Turkey, which have also deteriorated as that country’s slide toward authoritarianism has undermined efforts to bring deeper economic integration, as well as a discussion of how to retaliate against Mr. Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on imported steel and aluminum citing security concerns.

It is yet another reminder of what is fast becoming the EU’s central challenge: How does a project founded on the rule of international low manage strategic relations with its neighbors in a world where respect for international law is breaking down?

Write to Simon Nixon at simon.nixon@wsj.com

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